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THE INHERENT TENSION BETWEEN VALUE




When individuals negotiate, they often assume a “fixed pie.”
They believe that whatever they want, the other side values
equally.  As a result, each item traded generates a plus score for
the recipient of that term that is offset by a commensurate loss by
the other party.1  A classic example involves a lawsuit where the
only issue in dispute concerns the amount of money the defendant
will pay to the claimant.  If the plaintiff receives $100,000, the de-
fendant loses $100,000.  If the claimant obtains $500,000, the defen-
dant loses $500,000.  These situations are frequently referred to as
“zero sum” interactions.
Competitive/Adversarial “win-lose” litigators tend to view al-
most all settlement discussions as zero sum endeavors, ignoring the
possibility for joint gains.2  For example, a patient who has filed a
medical malpractice lawsuit resulting from serious treatment com-
plications may seek only monetary compensation.  If she demands
immediate cash payment of a specific amount, the interaction will
truly be zero sum.  On the other hand, if she agrees to accept pay-
ments over a number of years, the overall pie may be expanded in
several critical ways.  If some of the damages covers lost earnings
over a number of years, a lump sum may be taxable at a higher rate
than smaller amounts paid out over several years.  The parties may
alternatively characterize more of the money being exchanged as
compensation for pain and suffering associated with physical inju-
ries that are not taxable under section 104(a) of the Tax Code.3  In
addition, when future payments are made, the defendant can set
* Freda H. Alverson Professor, George Washington University Law School. J.D., 1971, Uni-
versity of Michigan; M. Indus. & Lab. Rels., 1968, Cornell University School of Indus. & Labor
Rels.; B.S., 1967,
1 See Leaf Van Boven & Leigh Thompson, A Look into the Mind of the Negotiator: Mental
Models in Negotiation, in 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 387, 388 (2003).
2 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 61 (1983).
3 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (2000).
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money aside and invest it in stocks or bonds that will generate divi-
dends or interest until the sums have to be transferred to the claim-
ant.  A substantial portion of the settlement amount may cover
corrective medical services.  If the defendant agrees to provide
those services, both sides may benefit.  What might have cost the
claimant $20,000 to obtain from other medical providers may only
cost the defendant $12,000 to provide, generating savings of $8,000.
The defendant may value a confidentiality provision preclud-
ing the disclosure of any aspects of the settlement agreement to
protect its reputation, and it may be willing to pay extra to obtain
such a clause.  Similarly, the defendant may agree to pay more for
a non-admission provision indicating that the settlement does not
constitute an admission of fault on its behalf. The claimant may
value a sincere apology from the responsible party, and would
lower her monetary demand if she is presented with one.  The de-
fendant may be willing to pay an extra $20,000 to $25,000 for the
confidentiality provision and an equal amount for the confidential-
ity clause.  On the other hand, the plaintiff may be willing to accept
$25,000 less if she receives an apology.  Thus, these three terms
could generate a joint surplus approaching $75,000.
Transactional negotiators seeking a buy-sell contract, consider-
ing a possible joint venture agreement, or contemplating a licens-
ing arrangement pertaining to new technology usually have a
number of different issues to be resolved.  If the parties view their
interaction as zero sum, they are likely to engage in an adversarial
exchange, as each side endeavors to obtain the best results for it-
self.  Such an approach will not only make the interaction less
pleasant and more difficult, but will also threaten future relations
between the negotiating parties.
A typical buy-sell interaction may initially appear to be a zero
sum transaction, with the buyer giving up an amount equal to what
the seller is obtaining.  Nonetheless, parties involved in such dis-
cussions should look for ways to expand the pie.  The seller may
agree to accept $50 million paid out over ten years, or some remu-
neration in the form of stock in the purchasing firm.  The purchas-
ing corporation may agree to pay $40 million in cash and provide
$12 million in goods and services.  Although the seller thinks it got
paid $52 million, the buyer only paid $47 million.  The $5 million
difference is based upon the fact that the goods and services valued
at $12 million by the seller only cost the buyer $7 million to
generate.
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When parties enter into a licensing agreement, different issues
must be addressed.  How much money will be paid when the con-
tract is executed?  How expansive will the license contract be?
Will it be exclusive or non-exclusive?  Will it have global scope or
more limited geographic coverage?  How long will the license term
operate?  What will be the royalty rate? As the parties discuss
these issues, they must try to determine which terms the licensor
and licensee value most.  By achieving an efficient agreement
which maximizes the joint gains achieved by both sides, the parties
can expand the pie and generate a meaningful surplus.
When negotiating parties interact, they must work to ascertain
possible ways to expand the overall pie—they should not simply
assume zero sum situations.  The greater the overall value of issues
to be shared, the greater the likelihood that both sides will achieve
beneficial results. As they begin to discover the potential for joint
gains, the parties must decide how to divide the generated surplus.
Many persons naively think that the parties should equally share
the surplus.  In reality, however, most interactants are likely to use
distributive bargaining techniques to claim more of the surplus for
their own side.  What makes this issue more complex is the fact
that the negotiating parties rarely know how much surplus has ac-
tually been created, which makes it impossible to know precisely
how much each side is taking.  In addition, one party may desire a
successful transaction more than the other, and thus be willing to
give up more than half of the surplus to guarantee an overall
agreement.
When negotiators look for ways to expand the overall pie and
create joint surplus, they must indicate the items they desire, the
interests underlying those issues, and the degree to which they
value those terms.  Nonetheless, they may not be entirely forth-
right.  If Side A highly values Item 5, but thinks that Side B does
not consider that term significant, Side A may understate the de-
gree to which it wants Item 5, hoping it will not have to give up
very much to obtain it.  Similarly, if Side B thinks that Side A re-
ally wants Item 5, Side B may suggest that this term is vital to it,
hoping to induce Side A to make a significant concession to obtain
that term.  Once the surplus has been generated, parties may simi-
larly employ disingenuous bargaining tactics to claim a greater
share of that surplus.
[E]ven within the range of circumstances in which there are sig-
nificant opportunities for integrative bargaining, the bargainer
must almost always engage in distributive bargaining as well.
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Therefore, it is in the bargainer’s self-interest not just to adopt
the tactics of openness and truth-telling that are said to be ap-
propriate for integrative bargaining, but somehow also to adopt
the tactics of truth-hiding and dissimulation that are said to be
appropriate to distributive bargaining.4
This article will discuss the inherent tension present in almost
all legal and commercial negotiations between value creation and
value claiming.  How should interactants use integrative techniques
to discover areas for potential joint gains, and how should they de-
termine the actual value of the gains achieved?  The article will
then explore the way in which proficient negotiators employ dis-
tributive tactics to claim a greater share of the surplus for them-
selves.  Before we examine those issues, however, we must
consider different negotiator styles and the ways in which those
styles influence value creation and value claiming.
I. NEGOTIATOR STYLES
Most negotiation experts tend to divide negotiators into two
opposite stylistic groups: Cooperative/Problem-Solvers and Com-
petitive/Adversarials.  The most extensive studies of legal negotia-
tor styles were conducted in 1976 by Gerald Williams5 and in 1999
by Andrea Schneider.6  Cooperative/Problem-Solvers move psy-
chologically toward their opponents, work to maximize the joint
returns achieved, begin with realistic opening offers, seek fair re-
sults, behave courteously and professionally, are open and trusting,
rarely resort to threats, rely upon objective standards, and reason
with their adversaries.7  Competitive/Adversarials move psycholog-
ically against their opponents, seek to maximize their own side re-
turns, begin with more extreme opening positions, seek more
extreme results favoring their own side, behave less courteously,
and are closed, untrusting, and manipulative.8  Competitive/Adver-
4 Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L. J. 369, 390–91
(1996).
5 See generally GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983).
6 See generally Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence
on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Styles, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143 (2002).
7 See CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 9–10 (6th
ed. 2009).
8 Id.
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sarial negotiators frequently conceal their negative information
and overstate their positive information.9
Professor Williams conducted his study with attorneys in
Phoenix. He asked lawyers not to classify themselves, but to char-
acterize the styles of attorneys with whom they had recently inter-
acted.  Almost two-thirds of legal practitioners were classified as
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers, one quarter as Competitive/Adver-
sarials, and eleven percent remained unclassified.10  Professor Wil-
liams asked the individuals in his study to indicate which of the
persons involved were effective, average, or ineffective negotia-
tors.11  Fifty-nine percent of the Cooperative/Problem-Solvers were
considered effective, thirty-eight percent average, and three per-
cent ineffective.12  Only twenty-five percent of Competitive/Adver-
sarial negotiators were rated effective, with forty-two percent rated
average and thirty-three percent rated ineffective.13
When Professor Schneider replicated Professor Williams’ em-
pirical study in 1999 with attorneys in Milwaukee and Chicago, she
found that sixty-four percent were characterized as Cooperative/
Problem-Solvers and thirty-six percent were described as Competi-
tive/Adversarials.14  Fifty-four percent of the Cooperative/Prob-
lem-Solvers were considered effective negotiators, forty-two
percent average, and four percent ineffective.15  Only nine percent
of the Competitive/Adversarials were considered effective negotia-
tors, thirty-eight percent average, and fifty-three percent
ineffective.16
The studies conducted by Williams and Schneider suggest that
most effective negotiators employ a Cooperative/Problem-Solving
style which generates complete openness and an effort to maximize
the joint returns obtained by the parties.  Nonetheless, when their
findings are examined more closely, it becomes clear that many ef-
fective negotiators are actually wolves in sheep clothing.  Williams
and Schneider asked the effective bargainers from both groups to
disclose their primary objectives in their interactions with others.
The primary goal for effective Competitive/Adversarials was to
9 Id.




14 See Schneider, supra note 6, at 163.
15  See id. at 167, 189.
16 Id.
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maximize their own returns,17 which is the classic objective of com-
petitive negotiators.  When effective Cooperative/Problem-Solvers
were also questioned about their main objectives, they indicated
that their second objective—just behind a wish to maintain high
ethical standards—was the maximization of their own side’s re-
turns.18  A more comprehensive evaluation of these factors has
caused Professor Williams and myself to conclude that there is a
hybrid negotiating style that falls between the Cooperative/Prob-
lem-Solving and Competitive/Adversarial approaches and com-
bines the optimal characteristics of both.19
Competitive/Problem-Solvers are individuals who strive for
competitive objectives—maximization of their own side’s returns—
but work to accomplish this goal in a non-adversarial way.20  Once
they obtain most of what they hope to achieve for their own clients,
they work to maximize the returns attained by their opponents.21
These individuals are more open than Competitive/Adversarials,
but less forthcoming than conventional Cooperative/Problem-Solv-
ers.22  They generally disclose the terms they hope to obtain, know-
ing that such disclosures are important if jointly efficient accords
are to be achieved, but they over- and under-state the degree to
which their clients want those items for strategic purposes.23
When Competitive/Problem-Solvers negotiate with naı¨ve Co-
operative/Problem-Solvers, they work to exploit their opponent’s
openness.24  They actually endeavor to create value during the In-
formation Stage in the Getting to Yes25 tradition, but they are not
entirely forthcoming.  They may over- or under-state the value of
items they desire to subsequently enable them to obtain more
highly valued terms for less; this may also enable them to attain
more from opponents when they concede issues that side values
but erroneously thinks this side also considers important.26  As the
parties move into the Distributive Stage, they similarly employ
17 See WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 23; Schneider, supra note 6, at 179.
18 See WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 20; Schneider, supra note 6, at 169.





24 See Steven Hartwell, Understanding and Dealing With Deception in Legal Negotiation, 6
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 171, 173–75, 185–86 (1991).
25 FISHER & URY, supra note 2.
26 See WILLIAMS & CRAVER, supra note 19, at 64–65.
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subtle, manipulative tactics in order to enable them to claim more
of the joint surplus than they give to their opponents.27
[E]ven within the range of circumstances in which there are sig-
nificant opportunities for integrative bargaining, the bargainer
must almost always engage in distributive bargaining as well.
Therefore, it is in the bargainer’s self-interest not just to adopt
the tactics of openness and truth telling that are said to be ap-
propriate to integrative bargaining, but somehow also to adopt
the tactics of truth-hiding and dissimulation that are said to be
appropriate to distributive bargaining.28
Unsuspecting negotiators do not understand how manipula-
tive and disingenuous Competitive/Problem-Solvers can be.  As a
result of the apparent openness of Competitive/Problem-Solvers,
their opponents usually think they are Cooperative/Problem-Solv-
ers.  Since negotiators often believe these individuals are being en-
tirely candid, they volunteer their own confidential bargaining
information without realizing that their openness is not being
equally reciprocated.29  They are certain that these persons are
working to generate “win-win” results, when they are really en-
deavoring to obtain “WIN-win” distributions favoring their own
side.30
If we negotiators were seeking truly equal terms and deals, like
King Solomon, we’d simply divide everything in half. In reality,
we’re out to achieve all (or most) of our goals, to make our most
desirable deal.  But the best way to do so is to let the other side
achieve some of their goals, to make their acceptable deal.
That’s WIN-win: big win for your side, little win for theirs.31
When Keith Allred conducted empirical studies of the traits
associated with successful negotiators, he found this hybrid ap-
27 Id.
28 Wetlaufer, supra note 4, at 372. See also Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining With a Hugger:
The Weaknesses and Limitations of a Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining,
or Why We Can’t All Just Get Along, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 65–66 (2007); Raymond
A. Friedman & Debra Shapiro, Deception and Mutual Gains Bargaining: Are They Mutually
Exclusive? 11 NEGOT. J. 243, 247–250 (1995).
29 See Catherine H. Tinsley et al., Reputations in Negotiation in THE NEGOTIATOR’S
FIELDBOOK 203, 207–08 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honneyman, eds., 2006) (in-
dicating how much more open Cooperative/Problem-Solvers are when they believe they are in-
teracting with other Cooperative/Problem-Solvers).
30 Id.
31 RONALD M. SHAPIRO & MARK A. JANKOWSKI, THE POWER OF NICE 5 (2001) (emphasis
in original).
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proach particularly effective.32  He analyzed the degree to which
adept bargainers used “strategic practices” designed to enable
them to claim more of the joint surplus for themselves and “accom-
modating practices” designed to maximize the joint returns at-
tained.33  Allred discovered that the most proficient negotiators
were considered by their adversaries to employ primarily “accom-
modating practices,” even though these bargainers admitted that
they actually used “strategic practices” that would enable them to
best advance their own interests.34  In fact,
[h]aggling permits bargainers to learn about, adjust to, and ac-
commodate the interests of other bargainers.  It permits them to
change minds, weaken convictions, make trades, call attention
to facts not fully considered, revive arguments dismissed prema-
turely, and express the nature of their interests and the intensity
of their resolve.35
The findings by Professors Williams and Schneider strongly in-
dicate that many lawyers who appear to follow the Cooperative/
Problem-Solving approach may subtly employ Competitive/Adver-
sarial techniques to advance their interests.36  Although they do
not commence bargaining interactions with the more extreme posi-
tions articulated by classic Competitive/Adversarials, they do not
open with the truly reasonable positions taken by real Cooperative/
Problem-Solvers.  They instead start with partially overstated de-
mands or under-stated offers, hoping to establish beneficial
anchoring points.37  They usually acknowledge their actual objec-
tives, but frequently over- or under-state the degree to which they
desire those items.  They do a good job of creating value by getting
the underlying interests of both sides on the bargaining table.
Once that is accomplished, however, they cleverly use manipula-
tive tactics that enable them to claim more than their fair share of
the joint surplus.
Competitive/Problem-Solvers are successful, because they rec-
ognize the fact that most negotiators judge their satisfaction with
bargaining outcomes more by the degree to which they believe the
32 See Keith G. Allred, Distinguishing Best and Strategic Practices: A Framework for Manag-
ing the Dilemma Between Creating and Claiming Value, 2000 NEGOT. J. 387, 394–395 (2000).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Robert J. Condlin, “Every Day and in Every Way We Are All Becoming Meta and Meta,”
or How Communitatian Bargaining Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining Theory), 23
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 231, 268 (2008).
36 See WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 27; SCHNEIDER, supra note , at 188.
37 See CRAVER, supra note 7, at 56–57.
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process was fair and respectful than by the objective value of the
terms obtained.38  Competitive/Problem-Solver negotiators are
personable and respectful.  They avoid overtly competitive behav-
ior, and act as if they are Cooperative/Problem-Solvers.  Their ad-
versaries are so appreciative of their seemingly open and courteous
conduct that they over-value the actual worth of the terms they
obtain.
During the value creation portion of bargaining interactions,
Competitive/Problem-Solvers learn more about opponent values
and interests than they disclose with respect to their own values
and interests.  This provides them with a significant advantage once
the parties begin to divide the joint surplus which has been created.
Through the use of subtle distributive techniques, they are able to
claim more of the surplus than their unsuspecting opponents ever
imagine.
II. VALUE CREATION
Many contemporary dispute resolution professionals associate
the integrative bargaining “win-win” concept with Roger Fisher &
William Ury.39  As Fisher and Ury recognize in their Acknowledg-
ments, however, the basic concept had been developed eighty years
earlier by Mary Parker Follett who became a business consultant in
the early 1900s and developed the integrative bargaining model for
her corporate clients.40  This important concept achieved more ex-
pansive scholarly and academic recognition with the publication of
A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations in 1965.41
The classic example of integrative or cooperative bargaining
involves two sisters who wanted the same orange.42  They argue
about the orange until they finally agreed to cut it in half and share
it equally.  Only later do they discover that one wants the pulp to
eat while the other wants the peel for baking.  They made the mis-
take of assuming that they both wanted the same thing.  Had one
38 See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Proce-
dural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 473
(2008); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 165, 170–71
(Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman, eds., 2006).
39 FISHER & URY, supra note 2.
40 See JOAN  C. TONN, MARY P. FOLLETT 360–388 (2003).
41 RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NE-
GOTIATIONS (1965).
42 See FISHER & URY, supra note 2, at 76.
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simply asked the other “why do you want the orange,” they would
have discovered that they had no conflict.  One should have been
given all of the fruit with the other receiving all of the rind.
What the orange example naively assumes is that in many bar-
gaining situations, the parties have non-conflicting interests.  If
there are ten items to be divided, Side A values Items 1, 3, 5, 7, and
9, while Side B values Items 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10.  The solution is to
make sure each side gets the five items it desires.  Such a situation
almost never arises in legal or commercial negotiations.43  There
may be items that only Side A desires and other items that only
Side B desires—the “cooperative” terms—but there will generally
be items that both sides wish to obtain—the “distributive” terms.
The classic distributive issue with respect to legal and commer-
cial interactions concerns money.  I have never had a client who
indicated that he, she, or it did not care about money, whether they
had to give it up or were trying to obtain it.  Some may have valued
it more or less than others, but every single one considered money
to be a significant factor.  Other terms may be equally contested.
A person harmed by the wrongful behavior of another party may
wish to obtain a public acknowledgment of responsibility, while the
responsible actor may want a nonadmission provision and a confi-
dentiality clause.  The purchaser of a business may want a warranty
against known and unknown environmental difficulties, while the
seller may be opposed to any such warranty with respect to un-
known conditions.  Divorcing spouses may each wish to obtain sole
residential custody of their two minor children.  Although com-
promises on these issues may be achieved through the negotiation
process, one side’s gain will generally be considered the other
side’s loss.
If negotiators hope to achieve efficient agreements that maxi-
mize the joint returns achieved, they must appreciate the benefits
that may be derived from integrative bargaining and must explore
the way in which each side values the different items involved.
Which items are desired by one side but not the other?  Which
items do both parties wish to have resolved in the identical man-
ner?  Which terms do both sides value—and how much does each
wish to obtain these items?
The terms desired by only one party should clearly end up on
that side of the bargaining table.  The terms the parties wish to
have resolved the same way should be handled in that manner.
43 See Russell Korobkin, Against Integrative Bargaining, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1324
(2008). See generally Condlin, supra note 28.
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The issues that both sides value will be the terms that both en-
deavor to claim—but they should still focus on efficiency consider-
ations.  Which of these items are considered “essential” by Side A,
but only “important” or “desirable” by Side B, and vice versa?
Which are “important” to Side A, but only “desirable” to Side B,
or vice versa?  Which are valued equally by both sides as essential,
important, or desirable?44
During the value creation portion of bargaining interactions,
negotiators must try to ascertain the relative values of the items to
be exchanged.  The optimal way to obtain the relevant information
is through the questioning process.  Proficient negotiators ask more
questions than their less adept cohorts,45 and they know how to
employ “what” and “why” inquiries.46  “What” questions are posed
in an effort to discover the different terms valued by the opposing
side.  “Why” questions are posed to determine the other side’s in-
terests underlying those terms.
Once individuals have thoroughly prepared for a negotiation,
they begin to interact with their opponents.  This is the Preliminary
Stage where the participants try to establish rapport with each
other and to create a positive negotiation environment.47  At the
commencement of their interaction, the interactants should use
small talk and look for common interests to enable them to de-
velop beneficial working relationships.  This decreases the likeli-
hood that either side will behave badly once they get into the
substantive discussions.  The parties should also strive to create
positive environments, thereby increasing the likelihood the par-
ticipants will behave more cooperatively, reach more agreements,
and achieve more efficient arrangements.48
Once the Preliminary Stage is finished, the parties enter the
Information Stage, which is the value creation part of their interac-
tion.49  This is where most questions are posed.  Even if the partici-
pants are integrative bargainers who seem committed to
cooperative interactions, distributive tendencies may influence ne-
44 See CRAVER, supra note 9, at 94–95.
45 See Hal Movius, The Effectiveness of Negotiation Training, 24 NEGOT. J. 509, 513–14
(2008).
46 See DEEPAK MALHOTRA & MAX H. BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS 85-86 (2007).
47 See CRAVER, supra note 7, at 65–72.
48 See Robert B. Lount, Jr., The Impact of Positive Mood on Trust in Interpersonal and Inter-
group Interactions, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 420, 421–22 (2010); Joseph Forgas, On
Feeling Good and Getting Your Way: Mood Effects on Negotiator Cognition and Bargaining
Strategies, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 566–74 (1998).
49 See CRAVER, supra note 9, at 73–97.
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gotiator behavior.  The participants may be willing to disclose
most—and perhaps even all—of the items they value, but they may
not be entirely forthright.  They may decide to over- or under-state
the value of different terms for strategic purposes.  For example, if
they value a particular item highly but believe that the other side
does not care about this term, they may downplay the true signifi-
cance of this item.  This practice is done with the hope of obtaining
it without having to concede much to the other side.  Similarly, if
they do not value an item they are certain the other side really
wants, they may overstate the degree to which they value it hoping
to obtain a significant concession for it.
Are such deceptive tactics unethical for legal representatives?
Model Rule 4.1 states that “a lawyer shall not knowingly make a
false statement of material fact or law to a third person.”50  This
provision appears to proscribe negotiator misrepresentations that
pertain to client interests and values.  Nonetheless, when Rule 4.1
was being drafted, persons who teach negotiation skills noted the
types of “innocent” misstatements frequently made during bargain-
ing interactions with respect to actual client values and settlement
objectives. As a result, Comment 2 was included to expressly ex-
empt representations pertaining to such issues.
Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of
fact can depend on the circumstances.  Under generally ac-
cepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.  Esti-
mates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction
and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim
are ordinarily in this category, . . .51
Thus, it is clear that legal representatives may ethically over- and
under-state client values with respect to the different items being
exchanged, since such information does not constitute “material
fact” under Rule 4.1.  Further, Comment 2 allows attorneys to
over- or under-state client settlement intentions, enabling them to
demand more or offer less than the clients are actually willing to
accept or pay.52
The innate distributive aspect of almost all legal and commer-
cial negotiations creates the inherent tension between value crea-
50 THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2008 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 92 (2008).
51 Id. at 93.
52 See generally Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics for Real World Interactions, 25 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 299 (forthcoming 2010).
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tion and value claiming.  Truly Cooperative/Problem-Solving
Negotiators, who naively disclose all of their true values and inter-
ests to what are actually Competitive/Problem-Solving opponents
who are not really reciprocating their candor, place themselves and
their clients at a distinct disadvantage.  If they are wholly open
while their manipulative adversaries are not, they generate an in-
formation imbalance which can be exploited by adept opponents.
Their disingenuous adversaries can over- and under-state their ac-
tual values with respect to the different issues, and they can over-
and under-state their true settlement intentions.  It is as if they are
playing poker with their cards face up, while their opponents are
permitted to hide some of their cards.  By the end of the interac-
tion, the entirely open participants are likely to obtain far less of
the surplus discovered than their manipulative adversaries.
Naturally Cooperative/Problem-Solvers should be careful
when they initially enter the Information Stage.  They should
slowly release some of their confidential information pertaining to
client values and wait to see if their candor is being reciprocated.
If they are confident that the other side is being as forthcoming,
they can continue their openness.  On the other hand, if they begin
to suspect that the other side is not being as forthcoming, they need
to be more circumspect.  They should change their negotiation
style and not be as open.  They should still indicate the items their
side wishes to obtain, but not be too candid with respect to the
degree to which they desire those terms.  They may decide to over-
or under-state the value of items to avoid exploitation by Competi-
tive/Problem-Solvers who are using subtly manipulative tactics to
obtain more information and to ultimately claim more of the joint
surplus which exists.
If bargainers are overly deceptive, however, the participants
may be unable to achieve accords that should have been reached,
and the agreements generated may be inefficient due to the inter-
actants’ inability to discover and jointly exploit the different de-
grees to which they value the underlying issues.  Both sides will
leave potential client satisfaction on the bargaining table.  It thus
behooves bargainers not to be too deceptive during the Informa-
tion Stage.  They should generally indicate the items they would
like to obtain.  If they fail to do so, the other side may never offer
to provide them with these terms.
Negotiators should similarly not over- or under-state the value
of items so greatly that the parties miss the opportunity to generate
joint gains and to formulate more efficient agreements.  They do
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not want to see items that one side considers to be “essential” or
“important” end up in the hands of the party that only considers
those items to be “desirable.”  The party that places a greater value
on particular terms should obtain those provisions in exchange for
issues the other side values more highly than this side.
III. VALUE CLAIMING
After negotiators use the Information Stage to determine the
divisible items and an approximate understanding of the relative
degree to which each side values the different terms, they enter the
Distributive Stage during which they endeavor to achieve a mutual
accord.53  This is a highly competitive part of the bargaining pro-
cess, because no clear principles dictate the manner in which the
joint surplus should be divided.  Should the discovered surplus be
divided equally or equitably?  If the participants possess identical
bargaining power and equal bargaining proficiency, a relatively
equal sharing of the surplus might be appropriate.  The difficulty
concerns the fact that opponents are rarely situated so equally.
One side tends to possess more economic power than the other
and/or greater bargaining skill.  In such circumstances, a truly egal-
itarian distribution would be a windfall to the weaker or less adroit
participant.
Despite the objections of some theoretical academics, most
practicing attorneys would suggest an equitable division of the per-
tinent items that reflects the comparative power and negotiating
prowess of the interactants.  Even this objective is not easily attain-
able, due to the use of disingenuous tactics designed to enable the
more manipulative participant to claim an excessive share of the
joint surplus.  She may establish an artificial deadline to induce a
more risk averse opponent to cave in to her demands.  She may
employ real or feigned threats of litigation or a cessation of talks to
generate excessive opponent concessions.  She may imply that she
has other options she could accept if this party does not provide
her side with sufficiently generous terms.
This latter approach may raise substantial ethical issues.  For
example, assume a client hopes to sell his business for $10 million,
but would be willing to accept $8.5 million if necessary.  His repre-
sentative could begin the discussions with a demand for $12 mil-
53 See CRAVER, supra note 7, at 99–126.
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lion, $15 million, or even $20 million, to anchor the discussions
with an elevated position statement. Could she ethically indicate
that her client has an offer from a third party to purchase his firm
when he has received no such offer?  I believe the answer is clearly
“no,” because this would constitute a misrepresentation of material
fact proscribed by both Model Rule 4.1 and basic principles of
fraud.  If the owner has an offer from a third party for $8 million,
could his attorney indicate that they have a $10 million offer?  I
think that such an exaggeration would similarly contravene Rule
4.1 and expose her client to a claim for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion.  On the other hand, it would probably be acceptable for the
seller’s representative to indicate (truthfully) that they have an-
other offer, and suggest that this prospective buyer will have to pay
$10 million if they wish to purchase the company.  In this instance,
the exaggeration would merely reflect client settlement intentions
that are excluded from the scope of Rule 4.1 due to the exception
set forth in Comment 2.
During the Distributive Stage, most legal and commercial
negotiators use implied or overt threats, time pressure, and various
manipulative bargaining tactics54 to obtain more favorable terms
for their own side than they might objectively deserve.  I see this
demonstrated regularly by students in my Legal Negotiation course
and in the continuing legal education programs I conduct for state
bar associations and for specific law firms.  The results achieved on
the distributive terms of my practice exercises vary widely.  I have
one exercise where the monetary payments range from $250,000 to
over $2 million. I have another where the monetary range is from
$0 to over $250,000.
Before readers surmise that the existence of significant differ-
ences with respect to these distributive terms means that the par-
ticipants have achieved inefficient accords, I must note that my law
students learn how to fight over the distributive items while they
simultaneously work to achieve efficient distributions of the coop-
erative terms.  This is true whether the negotiators are particularly
cooperative or competitive.  The naturally cooperative interactants
strive for efficient and fair terms, while the naturally competitive
individuals seek efficient, but more one-sided arrangements.  Even
the competitive persons realize, however, that if they are inefficient
with respect to the cooperative terms, they will be less likely to
obtain as much of the distributive issues.  They thus work diligently
to ascertain the non-distributive needs of their opponents and to
54 See id. at 145–179.
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satisfy those desires.  They do not do this because of altruistic con-
siderations.  They instead appreciate the fact that if they provide
their adversaries with what those parties require in these areas, it
will be easier for them to obtain more of the distributive surplus
which has been created. Although my student agreements vary
widely with respect to the distributive terms agreed upon, I am
amazed by their ability to divide the cooperative items in a way
that generates the most joint surplus.  This is a practice legal repre-
sentatives should always follow if they hope to achieve fair—or
even unbalanced—final terms.
An empirical study conducted by Professors Kathleen
O’Connor and Peter Carnevale supports my observations with re-
spect to my Legal Negotiation students.55  Their study concerned
“common-value issues” that both sides wished to have resolved in
the same fashion even though they were not aware of their posi-
tional overlap.  Some of the bargaining pairs were entirely open
and cooperative with respect to their interests, while other dyads
included negotiators who could be disingenuous with respect to
their true interests.  O’Connor and Carnevale found that the indi-
vidualistically motivated pairs achieved higher joint outcomes than
the cooperatively motivated pairs.  This was apparently due to the
fact that individualistically motivated negotiators established
higher overall objectives for themselves than did the cooperatively
motivated participants, and the individualistically motivated per-
sons recognized that by generating the most efficient overall agree-
ments, they increased their chances of obtaining optimal results for
themselves.
Once negotiating parties have achieved agreements, how can
they be certain they have generated efficient accords?  The best
way is to move into the Cooperative Stage56 before they conclude
their interactions.  Prior to the time they enter this stage, however,
they should be certain they have reached definitive accords.  They
should review the different provisions agreed upon to be sure there
are no misunderstandings.  Near the conclusion of the Distributive
Stage, negotiating parties frequently move expeditiously to close
the remaining gaps. One side may have thought the other side was
conceding more than it intended or took something off the table it
did not mean to eliminate.  If they discover such misunderstandings
55 See Kathleen M. O’Connor & Peter J. Carnevale, A Nasty But Effective Negotiation Strat-
egy: Misrepresentation of a Common-Value Issue, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN
504 (1997).
56 See CRAVER, supra note 7, at 133–143.
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now, they are psychologically committed to an agreement and will
usually find a way to resolve their remaining differences. On the
other hand, if they fail to discern such gaps until one side drafts the
accord, there are likely to be claims of dishonesty and
recriminations.
Once the basic terms have been agreed upon and confirmed,
the participants should take a few minutes to see if there is any way
they can further expand the overall pie and simultaneously im-
prove their respective positions.  During both the Information
Stage and the Distributive Stage, most parties have over and un-
derstated the actual value of various items for strategic purposes.
As a result, Side A may have obtained several provisions Side B
values more highly, while Side B got some terms Side A values
more.  If they can discover these inefficiencies and exchange these
items, both sides should be able to improve their respective
situations.
During this portion of their interaction, negotiators should
look for terms they suspect may have ended up on the wrong side
of the bargaining table.  They should consider issues they over-
stated their own interest in due to the fact they thought the other
side wanted them more. They should ask the opposing side if they
were to concede these items, what could that side give to them.
Only when it seems impossible for one side to obtain further gains
without actual losses by the opposing party should the participants
consider their terms final.
When negotiators explore possible exchanges during the Co-
operative Stage, they should be careful not to indicate such prior
deception with respect to their true values, or they risk undermin-
ing the terms already agreed upon.  If their opponents begin to sus-
pect that they misrepresented many of their interests during the
earlier discussions, they may begin to think that they have been
excessively dishonest.  As a result, their adversaries may begin to
reopen many terms and possibly destroy the opportunity for a final
accord.
CONCLUSION
When attorneys negotiate, some assume “fixed pie” or “zero
sum” situations which necessitate resorting to highly combative
tactics, while others assume that each side wishes to obtain entirely
different items which makes it easy for them to use integrative
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techniques to achieve mutually beneficial accords.  Although many
legal and commercial interactions involve cooperative issues that
should be resolved efficiently to generate greater joint surpluses
that can be shared by the participants, they almost always include
distributive terms the parties both wish to obtain.
Many practitioners assume that opponents are either Cooper-
ative/Problem-Solvers who are open, trusting, and wish to generate
fair and efficient agreements, or Competitive/Adversarials who are
closed, manipulative, and hope to achieve one-sided agreements
favoring their own side.  In reality, however, many proficient nego-
tiators are Competitive/Problem-Solvers who work to achieve effi-
cient accords, but who employ subtle distributive tactics designed
to enable them to claim more of the joint surplus created.  As a
result, there is an inherent tension between value creation and
value claiming in most legal negotiations.
During the value creation portion of interactions, participants
should use the Information Stage to determine the pertinent items
and the relative values placed on those terms by the different par-
ties.  Negotiators must be willing to indicate what they actually
hope to obtain and the general degree to which they value those
terms. Nonetheless, Competitive/Problem-Solvers are likely to
over or understate the degree to which their clients want particular
items to enable them to obtain a strategic advantage over naively
open opponents.
Once negotiators have ascertained the various issues to be re-
solved, they have to use the Distributive Stage to decide how they
will divide those items, which tends to be the most competitive por-
tion of bargaining interactions.  Individuals should not assume that
their adversaries are altruistic persons who want to divide the items
fairly.  Most legal representatives will endeavor to claim more of
the jointly created surplus for their own clients, and persons who
fail to appreciate this reality are likely to end up with less when the
interaction is concluded.
